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Abstract
The Water Framework Directive (WFD) requires all EU member states to implement water tariffs to recover the 
costs of water services. This paper analyzes the potential consequences of different instruments for irrigation water 
pricing (area, volumetric, two-part tariff and block-rate), studying their impact on the sustainability of irrigated areas. 
The application performed focuses on the Campos district in the Spanish province of Palencia, using simulation mod-
els based on positive mathematical programming to simulate farmers’ behavior in response to the above-mentioned 
pricing instruments. A multidimensional set of sustainability indicators (economic, social and environmental) for each 
instrument is obtained, making it possible to construct a composite indicator for irrigated agriculture (CIIA) in order 
to measure the overall sustainability performance of irrigated farms. Results show that pricing irrigation water will 
have a negative impact on overall sustainability, since economic (profitability) and social (generation of employment) 
sustainability will decline, while only a slight improvement in environmental sustainability will be obtained. However, 
we show that in order to fulfill WFD requirements, block-rate pricing results in high rates of public-sector revenues 
derived from irrigation water payments and promotes a significant reduction in the demand for irrigation water with 
the lowest reductions in farm sustainability measured in terms of the CIIA.
Additional key words: composite indicators; irrigated agriculture; positive mathematical programming; water 
policy.
Resumen
Tarifación del agua de riego: una evaluación de la sostenibilidad
La Directiva Marco de Aguas (DMA) exige a los estados de la UE la introducción de tarifas para la recuperación 
de los costes del agua. Este trabajo analiza las consecuencias de la hipotética implementación de diferentes formas de 
tarifación del agua de riego (por superficie, volumétrica, binómica y por tramos), estudiando su impacto sobre la sos-
tenibilidad de las zonas regables. La aplicación empírica realizada se ha centrado en la Comarca de Campos (Palencia). 
Con este propósito se han empleado modelos de simulación basados en la programación matemática positiva, los 
cuales permiten simular el comportamiento productivo de los regantes ante la aplicación de los diferentes instrumentos 
analizados. La resolución de estos modelos ha permitido obtener, para cada instrumento de tarifación considerado, un 
conjunto multidimensional de indicadores de sostenibilidad (económicos, sociales y ambientales), a partir de los cua-
les se ha desarrollado un indicador sintético de sostenibilidad para el regadío (CIIA). Los resultados obtenidos ponen 
de manifiesto cómo la puesta en funcionamiento de las distintas formas de tarifación generarían un efecto negativo 
sobre la sostenibilidad del regadío en términos del CIIA, ya que empeorará sus sostenibilidad económica (rentabilidad) 
y social (generación de empleo), proporcionando tan sólo ligeras mejoras ambientales. En cualquier caso, al objeto de 
cumplir con la exigencia legal de la DMA, se evidencia que la forma de tarifación por tramos permite obtener elevados 
niveles de recaudación pública derivados de la tarifación del agua de riego y promueve una reducción significativa de 
la demanda de agua de riego con las menores reducciones en la sostenibilidad de las explotaciones medida en términos 
del CIIA.
Palabras clave adicionales: agricultura de regadío; indicadores compuestos; política de aguas; programación ma-
temática positiva.
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Abbreviations used: ABAND (risk of farming abandonment); BALN (nitrogen balance); BALP (phosphorus balance); CAP (common 
agricultural policy); CHD (Confederación Hidrográfica del Duero); CIIA (composite indicator for irrigated agriculture); CIIAeco 
(composite indicator for irrigated agriculture - economic dimension); CIIAenv (composite indicator for irrigated agriculture - environmental 
dimension); CIIAsoc (composite indicator for irrigated agriculture - social dimension); COV (soil covering); EMPLT (farm employment); 
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mathematical programming); SEAS (seasonal labor); SFP (single farm payment); SPEC (specialization); TGM (total gross margin); 
WAT (water consumption); WFD (Water Framework Directive).
1 As stated by Randall (1981), a “mature” water economy is characterized by an “inelasticity supply of ‘new’ water and the need 
for expensive rehabilitation of aging projects, more direct and intensive competition among different kinds of users and greatly 
increased interdependencies among water users”.
Introduction
The growing demand for water in Spain has in-
creased the relative scarcity of this resource. This 
situation has led to an intense debate about the effi-
ciency of water use in the agricultural sector, which 
is the main consumer of water (75% of total national 
withdrawals for economic activities in 2006; INE, 
2008). Apparently poor management of this resource 
in Spanish irrigation (large water losses and applica-
tion to crops with low profitability and demanding 
little labor) has served as an argument supporting, as 
an indispensable solution, the implementation of 
demand policies typical of a “mature” water econo-
my1, especially water pricing (Molle and Berkoff, 
2007).
The situation of water economy maturity is not 
unique to Spain, but shared by other states in the Eu-
ropean Union (EU), which is why the EU decided to 
develop a common policy for water management. The 
result was the approval of Directive 2000/60/EC of the 
European Parliament and Council, which establishes a 
framework for community action in the field of water 
policy (in short, the Water Framework Directive or 
WFD). The WFD established water pricing as the EU’s 
preferred water-demand control policy (art. 9). The 
Directive obliges member states to apply tariffs for 
water use before 2010 in order to provide adequate 
incentives to use water efficiently. This is expected to 
contribute to the achievement of the environmental 
objectives (the “good status” of water bodies) estab-
lished in the Directive.
Although water pricing is an environmental require-
ment, the logic on which the instrument is based is 
purely economic. In this regard, irrigation farmers, ac-
cording to economic theory, will respond to higher 
water prices by reducing their consumption, thus reliev-
ing the quantitative pressure on water bodies. Pricing 
affects not only the demand for irrigation water, but 
has further economic, social and environmental effects. 
The scientific community has performed extensive 
studies of the multi-dimensional impacts of pricing 
irrigation water. Studies pertaining to Spain include 
those by Varela-Ortega et al. (1998), Berbel and 
Gómez-Limón (2000), Gómez-Limón and Riesgo 
(2004), Gallego-Ayala and Gómez-Limón (2008), 
Iglesias and Blanco (2008) and Berbel et al. (2009). 
These studies examine the multi-dimensional impacts 
of pricing, presenting the performance of politically 
relevant indicators separately. However, in order to 
understand the implications of water pricing for the 
sustainability of irrigated agriculture, it is preferable 
to examine all its impacts jointly, taking into account 
the economic, social and environmental implications 
of this policy instrument simultaneously. This has al-
ready been done by Giupponi (2007) and Bartolini et 
al. (2010), using a Decision Support System and a 
composite index, respectively.
Furthermore, most previous studies consider volu-
metric pricing as the only means of applying the cost-
recovery instrument; it would therefore be of interest 
to analyze other water pricing instruments.
Within this framework, the objective of the paper is 
twofold. First, we aim to develop a methodology to 
analyze ex-ante the impacts of alternative instruments 
of water pricing on the sustainability of irrigated agri-
culture by estimating a composite sustainability index, 
following the approach developed by Gómez-Limón 
and Sanchez-Fernandez (2010). Second, we aim to 
demonstrate the usefulness of this methodology in a 
real setting as a tool for technicians and policy makers 
to support the design and implementation of instru-
ments for better governance of irrigated agricultural 
systems. For this purpose, the proposed procedure is 
implemented in the farming district of Campos in the 
Province of Palencia (Spain).
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Material and methods
Case study
We focus on the Campos farming district, located in 
the centre of the Northern Spanish plateau, in the prov-
ince of Palencia. Its high altitude (between 700 and 800 
m.a.s.l.) and great distance from the sea give it a 
clearly continental climate, with an average rainfall of 
around 500 mm per annum, spread heterogeneously 
over the year. Irrigated agriculture is thus the only al-
ternative to the rain-fed monoculture of winter cereals, 
allowing the introduction of summer crops.
Irrigated agriculture in the Campos district covers 
37,829 hectares, accounting for 14.5% of its utilized 
agricultural area, which is distributed among 2,096 
farms (the average irrigated farm has 18.0 ha).
These areas were transformed into irrigated land in 
the latter half of the 20th century through regulation 
systems for the headwaters of its main rivers (Pisuerga 
and Carrión) and irrigation channels for transporting 
these surface waters. These infrastructures are pub-
licly owned and are managed by the Basin Authority 
(Confederación Hidrográfica del Duero, CHD). The 
existing secondary distribution network is also pub-
licly owned, but is managed and maintained by com-
munities of irrigators.
The CHD allocates around 8,000 m3 ha–1 of water a 
year to communities of irrigators. The water is meas-
ured at the entrance to the main irrigation channels. 
Transport efficiency through the main channels is 
80.3%, while distribution efficiency through the sec-
ondary network is 85.5% (CHD, 2007). The average 
annual amount of water that actually reaches the plots 
is thus about 5,500 m3 ha–1. Sprinkler and furrow irriga-
tion are of about equal importance.
The most important irrigated crops are winter cere-
als (wheat –Triticum aestivum L.– and barley –Hor-
deum vulgare L.), which occupy 49.8% of the total 
area, alfalfa –Medicago sativa L.– (26.3%), sugar-beet 
–Beta vulgaris L.– (9.9%), maize –Zea mays L.– 
(9.4%) and sunflower –Helianthus annuus L.– (4.6%).
Irrigation water pricing is currently based on a fixed 
quantity, depending on the area irrigated, which in turn 
comprises three different items. First, there are two 
tariffs paid to the CHD: a) the regulation fee, for man-
agement of the infrastructures controlled by this public 
body (main reservoirs and channels), which is set at 
€ 24 ha–1 yr–1; and b) the water use tariff, for use of the 
publicly owned secondary network, ranging between 
€ 10 and € 30 ha–1 yr–1, depending on the characteristics 
of these networks in the individual irrigated areas. On 
top of all that, communities of irrigators charge contri-
butions of between € 20 and € 30 ha–1 yr–1 to cover 
operating and maintenance costs. The total fees paid for 
irrigation water in the study area amount to between 
€ 55 and € 80 ha–1 yr–1, equivalent to € 0.015 m–3.
We selected this area because it is representative of 
Spanish inland irrigated agricultural systems and also 
because the multifunctional character of irrigated ag-
riculture is evident (Gómez-Limón and Gómez-Ramos, 
2007).
Alternatives for irrigation water pricing
As pointed out, the WFD forces member states to 
apply tariffs for water use in order to provide adequate 
incentives to use water efficiently and recover costs. 
However, this European directive does not specify how 
water pricing should be implemented. We have se-
lected four irrigation water pricing instruments for their 
potential implementation in the study area, taking into 
consideration the various alternative methods that are 
applicable to irrigation water pricing (Tsur and Dinar, 
1997; Johansson et al., 2002; Easter and Liu, 2005; 
Molle and Berkoff, 2007) and the specific characteris-
tics of the case study (public irrigated lands and surface 
water resources). These instruments are:
 — Pricing per unit irrigated area. Farmers pay for 
each hectare actually irrigated instead of the current 
system, which charges for each hectare eligible for ir-
rigation. Eleven pricing scenarios are suggested for the 
simulation, increasing progressively from € 0 to € 500 
ha–1 yr–1. These values were selected bearing in mind 
the current average payment for water services and 
expected increases due to the WFD (CHD, 2007).
— Volumetric pricing. Based on the volume of water 
used, eleven pricing levels have been selected, ranging 
from € 0.00 to € 0.10 m–3. These values are regarded 
as appropriate for the application of the cost-recovery 
principle required by the WFD (Gómez-Limón and 
Riesgo, 2004).
— Two-part tariff system. This is a combination of the 
two pricing systems described above, and levies a fixed 
tariff per hectare actually irrigated and a volumetric 
tariff on irrigation water. Nine combinations were gen-
erated: three fixed tariffs per hectare (€ 50, € 100 and 
€ 150 ha–1 yr–1) and three levels of volumetric pricing 
(€ 0.02, € 0.04, € 0.06 m–3).
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— Block-rate pricing. This instrument is based on set-
ting differentiated water prices, which increase progres-
sively on the basis of the band or block of water con-
sumption (Bar-Shira et al., 2006). We define three 
blocks of water consumption based on the crop irriga-
tion requirement and irrigation technology (0-3,000, 
3,000-6,000 and more than 6,000 m3 ha–1) and, similar 
to the volumetric pricing described above, four pricing 
levels were generated (see Table 1).
Obviously, these different water pricing mechanisms 
would also have a different impact on agricultural 
performance in the case study analyzed. However, in 
this paper we seek to compare them using the rationale 
of cost-recovery. Thus, we aim to ascertain the pricing 
instrument that yields the most sustainable performance 
for any cost-recovery level.
Decision-making heterogeneity and cluster 
analysis
Modeling farming activity at agricultural system 
level involves problems of aggregation bias (Hazell 
and Norton, 1986), which can only be avoided if the 
farms included in the models fulfill strict homogeneity 
criteria (Day, 1963): technological homogeneity, pecu-
niary proportionality and institutional proportionality2.
The irrigated area under consideration is located 
within a single agricultural county. Hence, bearing in 
mind climate and soil homogeneity, and technological, 
institutional and market characteristics (due to the 
virtual absence of economies of scale in farming ac-
tivities), the case study area may be regarded as fulfill-
ing the above-mentioned homogeneity criteria. It is thus 
reasonable to assume similar behavior for all farmers 
in the study area and to analyze water pricing instru-
ments via a single simulation model with relatively 
small problems of aggregation bias. However, such 
homogeneity in producers’ behavior rarely exists in the 
real world. For this reason, in order to minimize ag-
gregation bias in the simulation, we need to classify 
farmers in terms of homogeneous groups with regard 
to their crop-mixes (Berbel and Rodríguez, 1998).
In order to apply cluster analysis we surveyed the 
farmers in the study area. Taking into account the 
relatively large number of irrigators operating in the 
Campos district (2,096), we selected a representative 
sample of 111 farmers using a quota sampling proce-
dure for interviewing. Through the questionnaire de-
signed, relevant information for this study was col-
lected. For clustering purposes, the data regarding 
crop-mixes3 were used as classification variables. Clus-
ter analysis was performed using the Euclidean square 
distance between farmers’ crop-mixes and the Ward 
method as the aggregation criterion.
The simulation technique: positive 
mathematical programming
Positive mathematical programming (PMP), devel-
oped by Howitt (1995), is a mathematical modeling 
technique based on a calibration system established by 
a non-linear yield or non-linear cost function that re-
produce the same crop-mix distribution as that observed 
in the real world. Although both approaches (non-lin-
2 If a multi-criteria perspective is being considered, an additional homogeneity requirement emerges in order to avoid aggregation 
bias; viz., homogeneity related to choice criteria (see Gómez-Limón and Riesgo, 2004). In any case for this study it is assumed that 
farmers behave as profit maximizers, and thus, the differences observed in crop-mixes among farmers are due to the different 
production costs faced by each one of them.
3 Crop-mixed were actually featured bearing in mind the trinomial crop-irrigation_tecnhnology-tillage_technique. Further information 
about this issue is discussed in the section entitled “Decision variables”.
Table 1. Water pricing alternatives for the block-rate system
Block-rate
water allowance
Water price (€ m–3)
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Alternative 4
0 – 3,000 m3 ha–1 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
3,000 – 6,000 m3 ha–1 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
≥ 6,000 m3 ha–1 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12
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ear yield and cost functions) are equally valid as means 
of calibrating mathematical models, the method based 
on cost calibration is more frequently encountered in 
the literature than that based on yields. On this premise, 
we employed quadratic cost functions as the mathe-
matical calibration method, since the main differences 
among farms (see Section “Case study”) lie in their 
cost production structures rather than their yields, the 
latter being relatively homogeneous due to similar 
agro-climate conditions.
The standard calibration procedure described by 
Howitt (1995) is based on three steps. The first consists 
of building a linear programming model to obtain the 
dual-value variables for each of the activities (crops) 
under consideration. These dual-value variables (l) 
represent the marginal cost vector and can be inter-
preted as the marginal opportunity cost of not having 
the last unit of resource (Howitt, 2006). In the second 
step, these variables are used to calibrate the cost func-
tions of the individual crops. Finally, in the third step, 
cost function parameters are used to define a non-lin-
ear objective function that will reproduce base-year 
crop distribution.
The original PMP method has received criticism, 
some shortcomings of the technique being identified 
(Heckelei and Britz, 2005; Henry de Frahan et al., 
2007). This has led to further development of the PMP 
with the aim of mitigating the drawbacks of the origi-
nal approach. Röhm and Dabbert (2003) present an 
extension of the PMP that permits a greater amount of 
substitution between similar crops (called “variant 
activities”) than between other less similar crops (ac-
tivities). The concept of variant activities can thus be 
applied to either the same crop that is grown using 
different techniques (e.g. irrigated and rain-fed) or 
crops that belong to the same family (Röhm and Dab-
bert, 2003). This property is suitable for identifying 
relevant water pricing scenarios, since farmers would 
presumably substitute irrigated crops for rain-fed ones.
Taking into account activities i and their possible 
variants j, the mathematical formulation of the ex-
tended PMP that allows obtaining the required dual 
values is as follows (Röhm and Dabbert, 2003):
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Eq. [1a] represents the linear programming model 
objective function, where TGM is the total gross mar-
gin. TGM is calculated as the sum of the gross margins 
resulting from each activity. The objective function is 
therefore a function of the area allocated to each crop, 
xi,j (hectares devoted to crop i, with variant j). These 
xi,j are the decision variables of the model. To calculate 
TGM it is also necessary to possess the following tech-
nical coefficient data, where pi,j, yi,j, ci,j and si,j represent 
crop prices (measured in € kg–1), yield (kg ha–1), vari-
able cost (€ ha–1) and common agricultural policy 
(CAP) coupled subsidies per unit area (€ ha–1), respec-
tively. TGM also includes the single farm payment 
(SFP), which is based on farmers’ historical payments 
measured in euros per hectare4. 
The above-mentioned model has a set of constraints. 
Eq. [1b] is a structural constraint that limits total agri-
cultural land available, where xoi,j represents the crop-mix 
observed in the base year. This constraint produces the 
dual value of the land (lland) that was used to intercept 
the dual value of the least profitable crop. Eq. [1c] and 
[1d] represent the calibration constraints. Eq. [1c] rep-
resents the constraints for total activities, where l1 is 
a small positive number and Eq. [1d] represents the 
constraints for the variant activity, with l2 another 
small positive number that must satisfy Eq. [1e]. Fi-
nally, Eq. [1f] includes the set of “ordinary” constrains 
(i.e., agronomic, legal, market, etc.) that farmers need 
to fulfill in this calibration model. 
Adding Eqs. [1c] and [1d] forces an optimal solution 
in the linear programming model that reproduces the 
4 The Single Farm Payment (SFP) is a subsidy that agricultural producers receive independently of their crop-mixes or the yields 
achieved, which is fixed individually on the basis of the amount of subsidies they have been granted in the past. Hence, the SFP 
should be considered “fixed income”, regardless of crop decisions taken by farmers. Therefore, the SFP is just added into Eq. [1a] 
in order to calculate farmers’ TGM.
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activities observed in the base year (xoi,j). As a result of 
introducing these two constraints, the model solution 
generates dual values for the individual activities. Eq. 
[1c] produces the dual values of activities li and Eq. [1d] 
the dual values of the variant activity li,j. Nonetheless, 
since the number of constraints exceeds the number of 
variables in the primal, some of the variables have dual 
values equal to zero. This circumstance is observed in 
the dual value of the least profitable activity (li) and in 
that of the least profitable variant activity (li,j). How-
ever, this situation can be resolved by employing the 
calibration method developed by Röhm and Dabbert 
(2003) for the least profitable crop and variant activity.
Once the dual values have been obtained, they are 
used to calibrate the cost function of the individual 
activities. These parameters are also used to define the 
new objective function for the PMP model. Eq. [2] 
presents the objective function of the extended version 
of the PMP, including these non-linear cost functions:
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This PMP approach as a simulation model has al-
ready been followed by Cortignani and Severini (2009), 
Gallego-Ayala and Gómez-Limón (2009) and Hense-
ler et al. (2009) among others.
Calculating the composite sustainability 
indicator
The following sections explain how we calculated 
the Composite Indicator for Irrigated Agriculture 
(CIIA) used in this study according to the guidelines 
suggested by the OECD-JRC (2008).
First, we select a set of indicators to assess farm 
sustainability covering the economic, social and envi-
ronmental components of sustainability. We opt for the 
theoretical framework proposed by van Cauwenbergh 
et al. (2007), known as SAFE (Sustainability Assess-
ment of Farming and the Environment Framework). 
This approach considers the goods and services pro-
vided by agricultural ecosystems, resulting in the pri-
mary level of the hierarchy; i.e. the “principles” that 
are correlated with the three dimensions of sustainabil-
ity: economic, social and environmental. From these 
principles we can derive the “criteria” that comprise 
the second order of the hierarchy, from which we fi-
nally derive the “indicators” themselves. This frame-
work has been the starting point for our selection of 
Table 2. Selected basic indicators
Sustainability 
dimensions Indicators Measurement units
Economic Total Gross Margin (TGM) € ha–1
Contribution to the regional GDP (GDP) € ha–1
Social Farm employment (EMP) Working-hours ha–1
Seasonal labor (SEAS) %
Risk of farming abandonment (ABAN) %
Environmental Specialization (SPEC) %
Soil covering (COV) %
Nitrogen balance (BALN) kg N ha–1
Phosphorus balance (BALP) kg P ha–1
Pesticides risk (PEST) kg ha–1
Water consumption (WAT) m3 ha–1
Energy balance (ENBA) kcal ha–1
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indicators. Table 2 displays those finally chosen. For 
further information about the interpretation of each one 
of these indicators, interested readers may consult the 
research by Gómez-Limón and Sanchez-Fernandez 
(2010).
Second, as indicators chosen are measured in differ-
ent units, a normalization procedure is required before 
operating with them. Regarding the normalization 
techniques available (Freudenberg, 2003), we employ 
“min-max” normalization, making values of all normal-
ized indicators vary within a dimensionless range (0,1), 
where 0 represents the worst possible value of the in-
dicator (i.e., the least sustainable value of all the alter-
native water pricing scenarios) and 1 the best (i.e., the 
most sustainable value among the alternative water 
pricing scenarios).
Thirdly, we also require an indicator weighting in 
order to differentiate their relative importance. Regard-
ing this point, it is worth mentioning the research by 
Gómez-Limón and Atance (2004), who addressed the 
relative importance of public objectives that should 
guide agricultural policy in the Spanish region of Cas-
tilla y León, where the case study is located. In order 
to achieve this objective, they applied the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process to a hierarchical structure in which 
criteria were identified with economic, social and en-
vironmental objectives. In order to estimate the weights 
assigned to each generic objective they carried out a 
survey of citizens, obtaining a sample of 321 valid 
questionnaires (pair comparisons to build individual 
Saaty matrices). Because of the similarity between the 
generic objectives considered in that study and the three 
basic dimensions of sustainability analyzed in this 
paper, we regard the results obtained by Gómez-Limón 
and Atance (2004) as suitable for weighting our crite-
ria. Thus, we have: weco=28.5%, wsoc=39.9% and 
wenv=31.7% (see second row in Figure 1).
For the case of sub-criteria (indicators) weighting, 
we employed a panel of 16 experts from universities 
and research institutes. Each of these experts com-
pleted three Analytic Hierarchy Process questionnaires 
in order to provide the pair-wise comparisons needed 
to calculate relative weightings for the various indica-
tors considered in each of the three dimensions of 
sustainability (economic, social and environmental). 
Once each expert’s weightings had been estimated, 
these weights were aggregated using the geometric 
mean. This provided a technical consensus regarding 
relative weightings for indicators within each dimen-
sion of sustainability, as can be seen in the third row 
of Figure 1. In any case, to make such weights opera-
tive, it is necessary to normalize them (normalized 
weights should add up to one). In order to meet this 
requirement, the weight of each sub-criterion (indica-
tor) is multiplied by the weight of its own criterion 
(importance of economic, social or environmental 
sustainability). The final results can be seen in the 
fourth row of Figure 1.
Fourth, we selected the functional form of aggrega-
tion. This step is one of the most controversial when 
building composite indicators (Morse et al., 2001; Ebert 
and Welsch, 2004; Hueting and Reijnders, 2004; 
Böhringer and Jochem, 2007). The choice is not trivi-
al, as it influences the type of compensation or “mar-





















 w1 = wTGM w2 = wGDP 
 70.1% 29.7% 
 w3 = wEMP w4 = wSEAS w5 = wABAN
 38.5% 13.6% 40.5%
 w6 = wSPEC w7 = wCOV w8 = wBALN w9 = wBALP w10 = wPEST w11 = wWAT w12 = wEBA
 7.4% 15.0% 16.4% 8.8% 20.2% 17.9% 23.4%
 w*1 = w*TGM w*2 = w*GDP 
 20.0% 8.5% 
 w*3 = w*EMP w*4 = w*SEAS w*5 = w*ABAN
 15.4% 5.4% 16.2%
 w*6 = w*SPEC w*7 = w*COV w*8 = w*BALN w*9 = w*BALP w*10 = w*PEST w*11 = w*WAT w*12 = w*EBA
 2.4% 4.8% 5.2% 2.8% 6.4% 5.7% 7.4%
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ginal rate of substitution” among indicators (Munda, 
2005), depending on the algebraic alternative. In brief, 
additive linear functions implicitly assume total com-
pensation among indicators and multiplicative and 
geometric functions permit partial compensation; con-
versely, there are also non-compensatory multi-crite-
rion functions. Thus, depending on the aggregation 
method employed to obtain the indices, the results and 
the conclusions drawn from them may differ from case 
to case. We address the above challenge by aggregating 
them as a weighted sum of their normalized values, a 
procedure frequently used in assessing agricultural 
sustainability (Sands and Podmore, 2000; Rigby et al., 
2001; Hajkowicz, 2006; van Calker et al., 2006; Qiu 
et al., 2007). Following this aggregation approach, the 
overall composite indicator for irrigated agriculture was 
obtained as follows:
 











where w*k is the normalized weight associated with 
indicator k, and Ik is the normalized value of indicator 
k.
Partial composite indicators were also obtained for 
each sustainability dimension (economic, social and 
environmental) to analyze their relative importance, 
using the following expressions:
 


































Source of input information for models  
and indicators
The information needed as inputs for the simulation 
models, as well as for calculating the sustainability 
indicators, was collected from both primary and sec-
ondary sources.
The primary data source was the previously men-
tioned survey of a representative sample of irrigators. 
This survey allowed us to collect information about the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the owners, the struc-
tural characteristics of their farms, their crop plans and 
the agricultural practices and techniques they employed.
The information collected enabled us to characterize 
the diversity of farms in the area and to establish the 
farm-types in the district. The survey was also the main 
source of information used to construct the simulation 
models and calculate the base indicators.
Secondary information was also collected for output 
and input prices, coefficients of nitrogen, phosphorus and 
the energy content of inputs and outputs, water require-
ments for irrigated crops, efficiency of irrigation systems 
and pesticide toxicity. These data are identical for all the 
producers in the area and were therefore used to feed the 
models and to calculate the base indicators in every case.
Modeling
Defining irrigated farm-types  
in the study area
Cluster analysis resulted in four homogeneous groups 
of farmers. Table 3 shows the main features of these 
farm-types resulting from statistically significant differ-
ences among clusters, characterized by their crop plans, 
as well as the tillage and irrigation techniques employed.
The farm-types were the basic units of analysis used 
to construct the simulation models in order to minimize 
the aggregation bias discussed in the section entitled 
“Decision-making heterogeneity and cluster analysis”. 
A different model was constructed for each group of 
farmers in order to independently simulate the effects 
of irrigation water pricing methods. The results ob-
tained for each group of producers were subsequently 
aggregated at district level by weighting the sum of the 
results for each farm-type, based on the area repre-
sented by each of them. Both farm-type and aggre-
gated results are helpful for policy makers when de-
signing and implementing pricing instruments.
Decision variables
The areas devoted to each of the most common crops 
in the study area (xi,j) were the decision variables used 
to build the simulation models. Due to the differences 
in cost and existing yields, we found it most appropri-
ate to characterize these activities on the basis of three 
factors: crop, irrigation technology and tillage tech-
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niques. We considered only the combinations actually 
used by the farmers in the area, selecting a total of 34 
decision variables, as shown in Table 4.
The models simulate the productive behavior of the 
set of farm-types analyzed, including both their irri-
gated areas, whether these were used for irrigated or 
rain-fed crops, and those which are purely rain-fed 
(with no possibility of irrigation). This is a novelty in 
the literature and may prove to be more suitable for 
simulating irrigation farmers’ behavior.
Different groups of activities were defined following 
the extension of the PMP developed by Röhm and Dab-
bert (2003) to make the models more flexible and to 
allow for a greater degree of substitution among indi-
vidual activities (irrigated crops for rain-fed crops) in 
the face of water pricing policy. First, the activities i 
were established on the basis of crop and tillage technol-
ogy alternatives (e.g. wheat-conventional_tillage, 
sunflower-minimum_tillage, etc.). Second, for each 
activity i, variant activities j were defined on the basis 
of the irrigation techniques available for each activity 
(irrigated_furrow, irrigated_sprinkler and rain-fed). The 
resulting variant activities comprise a package of “crop-
tillage_technology-irrigation_technology” (e.g., wheat-
conventional_tillage-rain-fed, wheat-conventional_till-
age-sprinkle_irrigation). Finally, the different variant 
activities of winter cereals (wheat, barley and oats) were 
combined, due to the botanical similarity of these crops 
in one single group of variant activities. This assumed 
that within any group of these variants, there would be 
a greater degree of substitution (one irrigated crop for 
the same crop in rain-fed conditions, or one winter 
cereal for another crop from this botanic family) than 
between other activities (one crop with a specific tillage 
technology for another crop or another tillage system).
Modeling of pricing per unit  
of irrigated area
The model built to simulate the implementation of 
a fixed fee over the irrigated area appears below:
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Direct sowing cereal 
growers
Percentage of farmers 
sampled
37.8 19.8 31.5 10.8
Percentage of total area 
analyzed
41.5 17.5 29.4 11.6
Farm size (ha) 125 101 105 122
Percentage of irrigated 
land
31 42 48 40
Age (years) 44.5 44.2 46.1 43.5
Main tillage  
technology
Minimum tillage
(75% of the total  
farm area)
Conventional tillage
(100% of the total  
farm area)
Minimum tillage
(74% of the total  
farm area)
Direct sowing





(62% of the irrigated 
area)
Furrow
(59% of the irrigated 
area)
Sprinkler
(66% of the irrigated 
area)
Furrow
(71% of the irrigated 
area)
Main irrigated crops Winter cereals (51%) 
and alfalfa (26%)
Winter cereals (46%), 
alfalfa (23%), sunflower 
(12%) and maize (10%)
Winter cereals (44%), 
alfalfa (30%) and  
sugar-beet (12%)
Winter cereals (70%)







































Labor requirements constraint: 
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Sugar-beet CAP constraint: 
 
x xsug CT sug MT− −+ ≤ 50%
Sugar beet quota
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xi j, ≥ 0   
∀i j,  [8j]
Equation [8a] represents the objective function, 
which is fitted to expression [2]. This includes the fee 
per irrigated area ts that would be charged for the crops 
and variants actually irrigated (indicated by sub-indices 
ir and jr). The parameter of this fee was set to take 
values ranging from € 0 ha–1 to € 500 ha–1.
The first constraint [8b] limits the crop area to the 
total area (irrigated plus rain-fed) actually available on 
the farm (AREA). Constraint [8c] limits the irrigated 
area to the available irrigated area (AREAirrigated). As this 
is a short and medium-term model, rain-fed land cannot 
be converted into irrigated land. For the same reason, 
the possibility of introducing innovations in irrigation 
technology was not included. The area using sprinkler 
irrigation (crops and variants indicated by indices irs 
and jrs) is therefore limited to the area currently under 
irrigation using that technique (AREAsprinkler), as estab-
lished in expression [8d]. Equation [8e] limits the water 
available for irrigation, where ALLOT is the annual 
water allotment assigned to each farm measured in m3 
ha–1, WRi,j are the water requirements of the crop i,j and 
Efici,j is the technical efficiency associated with the ir-
rigation technique used for that crop. Constraint [8f] 
limits the availability of labor during the most critical 
(i.e. the most labor-intensive) periods of the year (p), 
with li j
p
,  being the labor requirement of crop i,j in pe-
riod p, and Lp the total availability of this input in the 
same period.
Constraint [8g] was included so that the optimum 
crop plans resulting from the model would respect the 
agronomic restrictions on alfalfa growing (see Foltz 
et al., 1992). Expression [8h] was incorporated in order 




CT MT DS CT MT DS CT MT DS
Wheat X X X X X X X X
Barley X X X X X X X X X
Oat X X
Green peas X X
Sunflower X X X
Alfalfa X X X X X
Grain maize X
Green maize X X
Sugar-beet X X
* CT: conventional tillage; MT: minimum tillage; DS: direct sowing.
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to permit a suitable simulation to be performed of the 
restructuring of the sugar-beet market following the 
latest reform of the Common Market Organization for 
sugar. In accordance with this reform, sugar-beet grow-
ers are obliged to abandon 50% of the production of 
this crop from the 2008/2009 season, for which they 
were compensated with € 40 per ton delivered on aver-
age during the four-year period 2004-2008 (a quantity 
which is included, duly annualized, in the SFP). Fi-
nally, expression [8i] is the market constraint relating 
to alfalfa. This constraint is included due to the inflex-
ible demand for this crop caused by the (almost) fixed 
requirements for feeding livestock (their size is fairly 
constant as a result of the CAP quotas). Demand for 
alfalfa is therefore unlikely to exceed the maximum 
production of the past ten years.
The set of constraints [8b], [8c], [8d], [8e], [8f], [8g], 
[8h], [8i] and [8j], referred to hereafter as AX B
 
≤ , 
have been included in all calibration and simulation 
models5.
Modeling of volumetric pricing
The model for simulating the implementation of 
volumetric water pricing is as follows:
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General constraint: AX B
 
≤  [9b]
where tw is the volumetric irrigation water tariff, a 
parameter that can range from € 0.00 to € 0.10 m–3.
Modeling of the two-part tariff system
We simulated the application of a two-part irrigation 
water pricing system with the following model:
Max x y p c x xi j i j i j i j i j i j i j i j i j
j
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General constraint: AX B
 
≤  [10b]
In this case the values of ts range from € 50 to 
€ 150 ha–1, and tw takes values of between € 0.00 and 
€ 0.06 m–3.
Modeling of block-rate pricing
Equation [11a] defines the objective function used 
to simulate the productive behavior of the farm-types 
under a system of block-rate pricing for irrigation 
water:
Max x
y p c x x
i j
i j i j i j i j i j i j i j i j
j,











































General constraint: AX B
 
≤  [11b]
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[11d]
5 Constraint [8h] was not used in the calibration model, bearing in mind that the compulsory abandonment of 50% of sugar-beet 
production came into force after the farming year 2007/2008 (Baseline scenario –calibration year).
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Non-negativity constraints:
 φ γ η ϕ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥0 0 0 0 ;   ;    ;    [11e]
where tw1 (tw1 = € 0.01, € 0.02, € 0.03 and € 0.04 m–3) 
refers to the unitary water tariff for the first block of 
water consumption applied to the volume 3,000- m3 
ha–1 derived from expression [11c], tw2 (tw2 = € 0.02, 
€ 0.04, € 0.06 and € 0.08 m–3) is the second block of 
water consumption, which charges the quantity  – η, 
deduced from expressions [11c] and [11d], and tw3 (tw3 
= € 0.03, € 0.06, € 0.09 and € 0.12 m–3) is the tariff 
corresponding to the third block of water consumption, 
which is charged for the volume , derived from ex-
pression [11d].
Calibration and validation of the models
The PMP models were calibrated taking into ac-
count the conditions faced by farmers in the 2007-2008 
farming year (Baseline scenario). The regulatory 
framework of the CAP for this period is the Mid-Term 
Review, which was approved in 2003. This scenario 
is characterized by the partial decoupling of the CAP 
payments, which means that producers of arable crops 
receive a ‘coupled’ area payment (based on the theo-
retical yields at county level) equal to 25% of the 
support received as part of the previous CAP scheme 
(Agenda 2000). The remaining 75% of this support is 
transferred through a “decoupled” payment (SFP) 
which is received annually by farmers regardless of 
their crop-mix. With respect to irrigation, the pricing 
mechanism in the Baseline scenario is the current one 
as described in the section entitled “Case study”. Tak-
ing this institutional framework into account, models 
for the Baseline scenario were calibrated using the 
information gathered from a survey carried out at farm 
level in 2008 (see the section entitled “Source of input 
information for models and indicators”), where all data 
(crop plans, yields, output and input prices, subsidies 
and other technical data such as agricultural practices 
and techniques) refer to the 2007-2008 agricultural 
season.
As Heckelei and Britz (2005) and Henry de Frahan 
et al. (2007) point out, using observations from a single 
year, as in this study, may lead to less robust simulation 
models, as the estimation and inference built under such 
limited information can produce inconsistent model 
parameters. As the PMP approach is very sensitive to 
baseline conditions (it affects the shape of the cost 
functions to be considered within the objective function 
in the simulation models), the validation of the models, 
in terms of the consistency of the parameters recovered, 
is a crucial part of the methodology employed to assess 
farmers’ responses to changes in the institutional frame-
work.
In order to check the robustness of the simulation 
models, we performed an ex-post analysis to validate 
them. For this purpose we checked, for each PMP farm-
type model, whether the values of the parameters pre-
viously estimated in the calibration step (farming year 
2007-2008) can accurately reproduce the crop plans of 
these producers when they faced a different institu-
tional framework. This was done for the former CAP 
scenario based on the Agenda 2000 Reform (farming 
year 2004-2005), which was characterized by public-
sector support through direct payments per unit area, 
calculated taking into account theoretical yields at 
county level. The Finger-Kreinin similarity index (FK 
index, see Finger and Kreinin, 1979) was calculated to 
compare the crop-mix observed in 2004-2005 to that 
obtained from the simulation in order to quantify the 
validity of the calibrated PMP models. The FK index 
ranges from 0 to 100, the latter representing no differ-
ence between observed and predicted data (for further 
details see Blanco et al., 2008). Table 5 presents the 
results obtained for this analytical exercise.
For the four farm-types that we evaluated, FK values 
exceeded 90%. This supports the validity of the param-
eters estimated to simulate the farmers’ decision-
making in the short- and medium-term and, more 
specifically, to assess their responses to alternative 
pricing mechanisms and/or the CAP framework.
Results
Composite indicator for irrigated agriculture
Preliminary results were obtained for each farm-type 
by running the models explained above. Subsequently, 
through weighted aggregation of these partial results, 
we obtained the results for the whole irrigated system, 
as shown in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 displays the values 
of the base indicators for the study area as a whole in 
each of the simulated pricing scenarios. The overall 
results are presented in terms of the values obtained 
for the CIIA composite indicator and its dimensional 
components (CIIAeco, CIIAsoc and CIIAenv), as shown 
in Table 7.
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Table 5. Model validation: observed crop-mix distribution in 2004-2005 vs. simulated crop-mix distribution for the Agenda 
2000 scenario
Crops
Minimum tillage cereal growers Conventional farmers with diversified production
Min. tillage and sprinkler irrigation 

























Irrigated winter cereals 16.15 14.88 14.88 19.91 19.07 19.07 19.95 18.89 18.89 24.50 27.91 24.50
Rain-fed winter cereals 60.44 60.60 60.44 51.98 59.18 51.98 40.85 42.68 40.85 51.17 55.27 51.70
Green peas  2.62  4.53  2.62  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.38  5.06  2.38  2.75  1.65  1.65
Irrigated sunflower  0.70  0.78  0.70  4.90  3.87  3.87  0.86  0.83  0.83  1.67  1.17  1.17
Rain-fed sunflower  2.88  3.00  2.88  1.63  2.31  1.63  4.17  4.07  4.07  5.33  3.08  3.08
Irrigated alfalfa  8.04  9.40  8.04  8.32  9.72  8.32 14.34 15.69 14.34  5.33  4.92  4.92
Rain-fed alfalfa  4.21  0.88  0.88  4.39  1.65  1.65  3.04  0.18  0.18  0.75  0.00  0.00
Grain maize 2.17  1.93  1.93  4.00  1.62  1.62  4.50  3.27  3.27  0.00  0.00  0.00
Green maize  0.69  1.26  0.69  0.00  0.00  0.00  2.80  3.80  2.80  0.83  0.98  0.83
Sugar-beet  2.76  2.76  2.76  4.88  3.99  3.99  5.54  5.52  5.52  7.67  5.05  5.05
FK similarity index 95.83 92.13 93.13 92.37
Table 6. Basic indicators for the Campos district*
Water pricing scenarios

























Baseline scenario 481.70 270.04 11.51 0.52 0.01 29.77 0.74 33.68 28.59 686.36 6,577 1.16 ? 107
Health Check 456.13 233.83 11.20 0.53 0.05 31.85 0.74 31.40 29.64 589.72 5,998 1.06 ? 107
Pricing instrument: irrigated area
100 € ha–1 417.53 290.96 10.65 0.56 0.13 35.05 0.74 30.80 30.06 549.90 5,099 1.00 ? 107
300 € ha–1 369.00 329.07 9.03 0.65 0.23 41.54 0.73 31.58 30.98 462.11 2,864 9.34 ? 106
500 € ha–1 343.16 340.15 8.37 0.69 0.29 44.56 0.72 31.34 31.44 419.79 1,920 8.77 ? 106
Pricing instrument: volumetric tariff
0.01 € m–3 429.30 274.34 10.61 0.56 0.11 34.02 0.74 31.87 30.02 555.69 5,145 1.03 ? 107
0.05 € m–3 375.86 302.79 8.48 0.69 0.22 41.38 0.72 33.76 31.28 439.87 2,282 9.43 ? 106
0.10 € m–3 344.14 350.74 8.26 0.71 0.29 43.83 0.72 32.49 31.66 408.82 1,821 8.81 ? 106
Pricing instrument: two-part tariff system
 50 € ha–1 + 0.02 € m–3 397.70 308.49 9.51 0.62 0.17 37.90 0.73 32.39 30.53 498.82 3,662 9.89 ? 106
 50 € ha–1 + 0.06 € m–3 364.22 340.69 8.57 0.69 0.24 41.82 0.72 32.54 31.32 431.83 2,306 9.05 ? 106
150 € ha–1 + 0.02 € m–3 375.98 318.85 8.86 0.66 0.22 40.90 0.72 32.49 30.96 460.20 2,732 9.51 ? 106
150 € ha–1 + 0.06 € m–3 350.27 350.61 8.39 0.69 0.27 43.30 0.72 32.03 31.45 419.89 2,011 8.87 ? 106
Pricing instrument: block-rate system
0.01-0.02-0.03 € m–3 424.46 310.45 9.88 0.60 0.12 35.00 0.73 34.48 30.23 531.77 4,268 1.06 ? 107
0.04-0.08-0.12 € m–3 362.86 449.95 8.63 0.69 0.25 39.85 0.72 35.48 31.27 445.04 2,498 9.55 ? 106
* TGM: total gross margin, GDP: contribution to the regional GDP, EMP: farm employment, SEAS: seasonal labor, ABAND: risk of 
farming abandonment, SPEC: specialization, COV: soil covering, BALN: nitrogen balance, BALP: phosphorus balance, PEST: pesti-
cides risk, WAT: water consumption, ENBA: energy balance.
The recent change in the CAP (implementation of 
the Health Check reform) would have in itself only a 
slightly negative effect on the sustainability of irriga-
tion farming in the study area. This negative impact is 
expressed by the decrease in the composite sustainabil-
ity indicator, which falls from 0.68 (Baseline scenario) 
to 0.61 (see Table 7). This fall is due to the total de-
coupling of production support, which encourages 
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greater extensification of production (introduction of 
rain-fed crops in irrigated areas), which in turn re-
duces the generation of added value and worsens the 
social performance of farming (observe the perform-
ance of CIIAeco and CIIAsoc in Table 7), without intro-
ducing significant variations in environmental sustain-
ability (CIIAenv).
The results obtained for the implementation of irriga-
tion water pricing point in the same direction: the dif-
ferent instruments generate a reduction in the overall 
sustainability (CIIA index) of the irrigated agricultural 
system analyzed. The explanation for this lies in the fact 
that farmers introduce new changes in their productive 
strategies as a response to water pricing, substituting 
irrigated crops for rain-fed alternatives (production 
extensification). This leads to a worsening in the eco-
nomic and social performance of farming, while envi-
ronmental sustainability remains practically unchanged.
These economic instruments erode the economic 
sustainability (performance of CIIAeco) of irrigated 
agriculture, as shown in Table 7. This is mainly because 
water pricing entails a significant reduction in farmers’ 
private profitability (TGM indicator), produced both 
by the payments they must make to the authorities in 
the form of fees (transfer of income from the private 
to the public sector) and also to changes in their crop 
plans (irrigated crops substituted by other rain-fed land 
crops with lower added value).
In addition, the pricing instruments that take into ac-
count the actual consumption of irrigation water (volu-
metric and block-rate pricing, which transmit the cost 
signal for water use more directly) lead to a smaller re-
duction in the CIIAeco index than tools that price water 
regardless of actual consumption (pricing by irrigated 
area). These differences can be explained because volu-
metric pricing and block-rate pricing minimize the emer-
gence of the above-mentioned economic inefficiency 
(reduction of farm profitability due to the introduction of 
crops with lower added value), leading only a transfer of 
income from farmers to the public sector. However, it 
must be stated that this is only true for low volumetric 
tariffs. As the amount of the charge increases, farmers’ 
income losses grow to a greater extent than the rise in 
public sector revenues (inefficiency also increases).
The introduction of water pricing would similarly dam-
age the social sustainability of irrigated land in the study 
Table 7. Simulation results for the Campos district
Water pricing scenarios
Composite indicators*
CIIAeco CIIAsoc CIIAenv CIIA
Baseline scenario 0.19 0.32 0.17 0.68
Health check 0.15 0.29 0.17 0.61
Pricing instrument: irrigated area
100 € ha–1 0.12 0.23 0.17 0.52
300 € ha–1 0.08 0.11 0.18 0.37
500 € ha–1 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.28
Pricing instrument: volumetric tariff
0.01 € m–3 0.13 0.24 0.17 0.54
0.05 € m–3 0.08 0.09 0.18 0.35
0.10 € m–3 0.06 0.04 0.18 0.28
Pricing instrument: two-part tariff system
 50 € ha–1 + 0.02 € m–3 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.44
 50 € ha–1 + 0.06 € m–3 0.08 0.08 0.18 0.34
150 € ha–1 + 0.02 € m–3 0.08 0.11 0.18 0.37
150 € ha–1 + 0.06 € m–3 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.30
Pricing instrument: block-rate system
0.01-0.02-0.03 € m–3 0.14 0.20 0.18 0.52
0.04-0.08-0.12 € m–3 0.11 0.08 0.18 0.36
* CIIAeco: composite indicator for irrigated agriculture - economic dimension, CIIAsoc: composite indi-
cator for irrigated agriculture - social dimension, CIIAenv: composite indicator for irrigated agriculture 
- environmental dimension, CIIA: composite indicator for irrigated agriculture.
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area. We can now see how the values of the CIIAsoc index 
fall rapidly and significantly as the charges for irrigation 
water increase. This is due to three causes: a) the loss of 
direct employment in irrigation (reduction in the EMP 
indicator), due to a downturn in demand for work as a 
consequence of substituting irrigated crops for less labor-
intensive rain-fed crops, b) an increase in the seasonal-
ity of labor demand (SEAS indicator), caused by the 
change in crop plans, and c) an increase in the risk of 
farm abandonment (ABAN indicator), which is closely 
linked to the loss of farm income for the reasons men-
tioned above. In any case, unlike the CIIAeco index, the 
development of the social component of sustainability 
does not display significant differences as a result of the 
pricing instrument used; they all generate significant 
decreases in the CIIAsoc index.
From the point of view of environmental sustainabil-
ity (CIIAenv), the implementation of irrigation water 
pricing is almost neutral (see Table 7). These results can 
be considered counterintuitive at first glance. However, 
they are a reflection of how the positive and negative 
environmental externalities associated with irrigation 
water pricing offset each other, in terms of CIIAenv index, 
generating an improvement in the WAT base indicators 
(reduction in the pressure of irrigation on water re-
sources) and PEST (reduction in the release of plant 
protection products to the environment). However, at 
the same time, the SPEC indicator (increase in single-
crop farming of winter cereals on non-irrigated land - 
reduction in biodiversity), COV (increase in the risk of 
wind and water soil erosion), BALN and BALP (increase 
in diffuse contamination by nitrogen and phosphorus 
derived from farming)6 and ENBA (reduction in the ef-
ficiency of the irrigation system as a CO2 sink) all record 
worse scores. This mixed environmental effect of pricing 
means that once the different base indicators have been 
weighted, the CIIAenv index remains relatively stable 
when this type of water tariff is applied.
Finally, Table 8 presents the impact of the different 
scenarios by farm-type. Interested readers can them-
selves perform a differential analysis of the farm-types 
considered.
6 The increased pressure caused by the use of nitrogen and phosphorus is also counterintuitive in terms of the literature. The cause 
of these results for the case study lies in the relative importance of alfalfa in irrigation, a legume crop with virtually zero balances 
of nitrogen and phosphorus. Indeed, in most cases, water pricing causes farmers to abandon this irrigated crop and replace it with 
rain-fed winter cereals, which have a greater demand for chemical fertilizers than alfalfa.
Table 8. Simulation results by farm-type
Water pricing scenarios
Minimum tillage cereal growers Conventional farmers with diversified production
Min. tillage and sprinkler irrigation 
cereal-sugar-beet growers Direct sowing cereal growers
CIIAeco CIIAsoc CIIAenv CIIA CIIAeco CIIAsoc CIIAenv CIIA CIIAeco CIIAsoc CIIAenv CIIA CIIAeco CIIAsoc CIIAenv CIIA
Baseline scenario 0.18 0.32 0.15 0.66 0.22 0.35 0.17 0.75 0.20 0.32 0.18 0.71 0.15 0.27 0.17 0.59
Health Check 0.14 0.27 0.15 0.56 0.19 0.34 0.17 0.70 0.16 0.29 0.19 0.64 0.13 0.26 0.17 0.57
Pricing instrument: irrigated area
100 € ha–1 0.11 0.21 0.15 0.48 0.16 0.28 0.17 0.61 0.13 0.23 0.19 0.55 0.10 0.19 0.17 0.47
300 € ha–1 0.06 0.09 0.17 0.32 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.47 0.09 0.10 0.20 0.39 0.06 0.08 0.18 0.32
500 € ha–1 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.24 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.39 0.06 0.04 0.20 0.30 0.03 0.04 0.18 0.25
Pricing instrument: volumetric tariff
0.01 € m–3 0.12 0.22 0.16 0.50 0.17 0.29 0.17 0.64 0.14 0.23 0.19 0.57 0.12 0.21 0.18 0.50
0.05 € m–3 0.06 0.07 0.17 0.30 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.45 0.08 0.07 0.20 0.35 0.07 0.10 0.18 0.35
0.10 € m–3 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.24 0.09 0.11 0.18 0.38 0.06 0.03 0.20 0.29 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.27
Pricing instrument: two-part tariff system
 50 € ha–1 + 0.02 € m–3 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.38 0.14 0.21 0.18 0.53 0.11 0.14 0.20 0.45 0.14 0.21 0.17 0.52
 50 € ha–1 + 0.06 € m–3 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.27 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.42 0.07 0.05 0.20 0.32 0.12 0.18 0.17 0.47
150 € ha–1 + 0.02 € m–3 0.07 0.09 0.17 0.32 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.47 0.09 0.09 0.20 0.38 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.41
150 € ha–1 + 0.06 € m–3 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.24 0.09 0.12 0.18 0.39 0.06 0.03 0.20 0.29 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.39
Pricing instrument: block-rate system
0.01-0.02-0.03 € m–3 0.13 0.19 0.16 0.48 0.16 0.26 0.18 0.59 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.54 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.45
0.04-0.08-0.12 € m–3 0.10 0.07 0.16 0.33 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.43 0.11 0.06 0.20 0.37 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.36
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Integrated analysis of public revenue  
and CIIA
In order to compare the different water pricing sys-
tems considered, we have also included public-sector 
revenue in the analysis. For this purpose, the exercise 
conducted has been completed by calculating three 
additional indicators regarding cost-recovery: public 
revenue per hectare actually irrigated (PUBRirr_surface 
measured in € irrigated ha–1), public revenue per cubic 
meter of water used (PUBRwater measured in € m–3) and 
total public revenue at irrigated area level (PUBRtotal 
measured in million €). Table 9 shows the results ob-
tained for these new indicators.
As explained previously, the irrigated district ana-
lyzed is fed with surface water managed through pub-
licly owned infrastructures. In such irrigated systems, 
almost all water delivery costs are fixed (operation and 
management costs and depreciation costs are not de-
pendant on the amount of water used). This circun-
stance means the results of PUBRirr_surface and PUBRwater 
need to be examined with care as cost-recovery indica-
tors, because the overall capacity to generate public 
revenue depends on the surface area actually irrigated 
and the amount of water actually used (see the fourth 
and sixth columns in Table 9). Thus, in order to study 
the availability of the whole irrigated district to re-
cover the costs of public water services, the only ade-
quate indicator is PUBRtotal.
The results obtained for the new indicators explained 
above indicate that all the water pricing instruments 
simulated generate significant increases in public rev-
enues and allow to reduce the quantitiave pressure that 
agriculture exerts on water bodies (see Table 9, WATER 
Table 9. Comparison of public revenue values and CIIA for each water pricing scenario*
Water pricing scenarios CIIA PUBRirr_surface(€ irrigated ha–1)
% of the irrigated 








Baseline scenario 0.68 67.50 0.00 0.0103 248.81 2.55
Health Check 0.61 67.50 9.19 0.0102 227.13 2.31
Pricing instrument: irrigated area
100 € ha–1 0.52 167.50 23.56 0.0251 192.77 4.84
200 € ha–1 0.43 267.50 39.37 0.0422 145.44 6.13
300 € ha–1 0.37 367.50 51.98 0.0618 107.98 6.67
400 € ha–1 0.32 467.50 60.16 0.0826 85.31 7.04
500 € ha–1 0.28 567.50 65.28 0.1030 72.34 7.45
Pricing instrument: volumetric tariff
0.01 € m–3 0.54 131.25 19.27 0.0206 194.68 4.00
0.03 € m–3 0.41 224.40 42.56 0.0429 113.64 4.87
0.05 € m–3 0.35 306.00 52.18 0.0642 86.29 5.53
0.07 € m–3 0.32 400.95 57.25 0.0842 77.02 6.48
0.10 € m–3 0.28 551.22 62.42 0.1140 68.76 7.83
Pricing instrument: two-part tariff system
 50 € ha–1 + 0.02 € m–3 0.44 234.29 37.28 0.0401 138.55 5.55
 50 € ha–1 + 0.06 € m–3 0.34 419.81 55.01 0.0833 85.74 7.14
100 € ha–1 + 0.02 € m–3 0.40 280.03 44.56 0.0498 117.99 5.87
100 € ha–1 + 0.06 € m–3 0.35 472.39 57.90 0.0930 80.92 7.52
150 € ha–1 + 0.02 € m–3 0.37 327.05 50.10 0.0597 103.39 6.17
150 € ha–1 + 0.06 € m–3 0.30 523.08 60.79 0.1027 75.53 7.75
Pricing instrument: block-rate system
0.01-0.02-0.03 € m–3 0.52 154.70 21.46 0.0269 171.12 4.60
0.02-0.04-0.06 € m–3 0.45 192.75 35.09 0.0416 113.72 4.73
0.03-0.06-0.09 € m–3 0.40 255.38 42.05 0.0551 101.52 5.59
0.04-0.08-0.12 € m–3 0.36 342.93 45.69 0.0730 96.546 7.05
* PUBRirr_surface: public revenue per hectare actually irrigated; PUBRwater: public revenue per cubic meter of water used; PUBRtotal: public 
revenue at irrigated area level.
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indicator). However, it should be noted that these en-
hancements are heterogenous across the water pricing 
instruments. Differences are mainly linked to farmers’ 
behavior (crop-mix decisions) when facing different 
water pricing scenarios (see the change in the percent-
age of irrigated land devoted to rain-fed crops in Table 
9). In any case, the most relevant information provided 
by Table 9 is the comparison of the different water-
pricing mechanisms (impact on farm sustainability 
measures such as the CIIA index) with the rationale of 
cost-recovery (PUBRtotal indicator). In this sense, we 
can see how area fee and block-rate instruments lead 
to the largest increases in public-sector revenue for any 
value of the CIIA index. Notwithstanding, the most 
suitable of these two instruments from a technical point 
of view is the block-rate system; bearing in mind that 
the differences in public-sector revenues compared with 
the area fee are small, but the block-rate system pro-
motes much less water consumption (lower impact on 
surrounding water ecosystems).
Discussion
Our study shows the practical utility of using com-
posite sustainability indicators as a tool for improving 
agricultural sector governance. Indeed, the use of com-
posite sustainability indicators makes it possible to 
address such a complex concept as agricultural sustain-
ability. This entails jointly considering economic, social 
and environmental indicators. Moreover, public-sector 
decision-makers may benefit from the use of indices to 
implement the guidelines derived from the WFD.
Notwithstanding, the main disadvantages of com-
posite indicators also need to be discussed. The two 
most important problems associated with these indices 
are (Hansen, 1996; Morse et al., 2001; Ebert and 
Welsch, 2004; Böhringer and Jochem, 2007): a) the 
implementation of additive aggregation methods that 
allow the individual dimensions of sustainability to be 
compensated for (commensurability), and b) the sub-
jectivity of the weighting process implemented in order 
to make the assumption that sustainability is a ‘social 
construction’ operative. Both circumstances could lead 
to biased results. Hence, further research is required in 
order to confirm the accuracy of the approach taken in 
this study or, on the contrary, to suggest other more 
precise methods to measure sustainability.
Simulation models based on PMP have also been 
found useful for ex-ante policy analysis. However, tak-
ing into account the set of assumptions this modeling 
technique is based on, the results obtained should be 
interpreted carefully. Further research in this sense is 
also required. In line with this, a comparative analysis 
of results using different matehamatical modeling ap-
proaches (PMP, multi-criteria, etc.) are worth suggesting.
Nevertheless, the results suggest the various pricing 
instruments have different impacts on the socio-eco-
nomic and environmental indicators and the sustainabil-
ity index. However, they do have certain effects in 
common: a) a significant reduction in quantitative pres-
sures (extraction from river flows), and b) generation 
of damaging economic effects (loss of private irrigation 
profitability) and social effects (loss of employment 
generated by the sector). In terms of the composite 
indicator calculated (CIIA), these dimensional effects 
would lead to a reduction in the overall sustainability 
of the agricultural system analyzed here.
Still, it is important to bear in mind that irrigation 
water pricing is not merely an option, but a mandatory 
instrument established by the WFD for all member 
states of the EU. The requirement is based on the 
premise that implementing cost-recovery pricing will 
help to achieve the environmental objectives of the 
Directive (the “good status” of water bodies). How-
ever, our results suggest that even though pricing is 
effective as a means of achieving this objective, it may 
not be truly efficient, insofar as water pricing policy 
also generates substantial costs which need to be taken 
into account, both socioeconomic (profitability and 
employment) and even environmental (erosion risk, 
CO2 capture, etc). This raises some doubts as to the 
suitability of the lexicographic order of the objectives 
pursued by the WFD, in which socioeconomic and 
other environmental objectives are legally subordi-
nated to the improvement of the status of water bodies 
(Rosenberger et al., 2003; Berbel et al., 2010). In fact, 
more reseach is required to assess all the impacts of 
water pricing (both positive and negative) in integrative 
fashion. Only in this way can we verify whether the 
implementation of water pricing increases or decreas-
es social welfare.
In spite of the merits of water pricing instruments in 
general, area fee and block-rate pricing appear to be 
the most suitable instruments for irrigation water pric-
ing policy, as they produce the smallest reduction in 
the CIIA index and the highest public-sector revenues. 
Nevertheless, the most suitable of these two instru-
ments from a technical point of view is the block-rate 
system; the difference between the two methods in 
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terms of public-sector revenues is small, but the block-
rate system promotes less water consumption. This 
said, it is important to note that excessively high price 
levels for each block could lead to large-scale abandon-
ment of irrigation due to its lack of socioeconomic 
sustainability. As indicated previously, this feasible 
impact should be analyzed together with all the other 
positive and negative issues in order to achieve a bal-
anced diagnosis that would eventually justify the 
derogation of the application of water pricing policy 
as established in the WFD.
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